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FEDERAL COURTS FOLD , SPINDLE AND MUTILATE SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
Does your municipality have a budget surplus? One way to quickly reduce i t  
is t o  permit sexual harassment in the workplace , or just ignore i t  like an 
ostrich with i t s  head in the sand. Either approach will do the j ob. Once again 
the federal courts have given employers notice that they will use existing laws , 
or invent new ones , to f ind employers liable for sexual harassment they knew was 
going on, and for sexual harassment they didn' t know was going on because they 
never took the t ime and trouble to f ind out. Two recent federal court decisions 
on sexual harassment , one handed down by the U . S .  Supreme C ourt , make that 
clear to any employer who is lis tening. 
Let ' s  look closely at those two cases . One of them involves a private 
employer and the other involves a municipality , but both of them i llustrate how 
easy it is for a municipality to be held liable for s exual harassment under both 
Title VII of the C ivil Rights Act of 1 964 , and under the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the u.s. C onstitution. Don ' t  panic at the sound 
of Title VII and the Equal Protection C l ause. While there is s ome legal mumbo 
jumbo involved in both of them, we will try t o  make it simple and understandable 
for our purposes. In fact , understanding some of the legal mumbo j umbo helps us 
to understand that the federal courts aren ' t  leaving many places for employers 
who permit or ignore sexual harassment to hide. Incidently ,  we won' t even look 
at s exual harassment cases under Tennessee law because sexual harassment suits 
have rarely , if ever , been f iled under Tennessee law. In fact , the federal 
courts are where mos t  s exual harassment suits are filed in every s tate. 
Title VII is the main federal law which protects employees against 
discrimination based on s ex,  race, color or national origin in virtually every 
kind of employment decision employers can make , including decisions which affect 
the "terms , conditions , or priviliges of employment. " In the f irst case we will 
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consider, the U.S. Supreme Court stretched the language ''terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment" to r.1ake it include sexual harassment. So now sexual 
harass1oent is discrimination prohibited by Title VII. The Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that, among 
other things, no person shall be denied the "equal protection of the laws." The 
Equal Protection Clause prohibits sex-based and other forms of discrimination by 
public (but not private) employers, including municipalities. In the second 
case we will consider, a U.S. Court of Appeals held that sexual harassment is 
discrminination which denies women equal protection of the laws. In other 
words, there is rnore than one way for a person complaining of sexual harassment 
to skin a municipality. 
We need to discuss an important federal statute in connection with the 
second case: 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or simply Section 1983. You have no doubt heard 
about that statute, but let us take some of the mystery out of it because it is 
the principal federal statute which comes up again and again in cases where a 
person is suing a state or municipality on the grounds that the state or munici­
pality violated his constitutional rights. Section 1983 is short, but packs a 
wallop. In essence what is says is that any person deprived of a constitu­
tional right by any state or territory '�nder color of statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom or usage" is entitled to sue the state or territory. The 
U.S. Supreme Court has held that "state" also means a county and a municipality 
under Section 1983. Note that Section 1983 does not itself contain any consti­
tutional rights; it merely authorizes a person to sue a state or a municipality, 
for the violation of his constitutional rights. 
Look closely at the language quoted from Section 1983 and you will see that 
it actually contains two ways a state or municipality can violate a person's 
constitutional rights: 
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- Through a formal policy expressed "under color of" a s tatute, an ordin­
ance, or a regulation, 
Through an informal policy of "custom or usage, 
Of the two ways a s tate or municipality can violate a person' s  constitutional 
rights, by far the most important is the latter, custom and usage, In the area 
of sexual harassment obviously few, if any, s tates or municipalities have 
statutes, ordinances, or regulations requiring or permitting sexual harassment , 
However, as we shall see, s ome employers and municipalities have a policy of 
sexual harassment which arises through custom and usage within the meaning of 
Section 1983 . 
There are important distinctions between cases brought under Title VII and 
the Equal Protection C l ause with which we ought to have at least a passing 
familiarity. Fi rst, under Title VII of the C ivil Rights Act of 1964 the victim 
of discrimination (sexual harassment or otherwise) is not entitled to compen-
satory damages, only restoration to his or her j ob, back pay, and other forms o f  
equitable relief ,  However, a victim o f  a constitutional violation i s  entitled 
to compensatory damages . Second, the victim o f  discrimination under Title VII 
does not have to prove that the employer intended to discriminate, only that 
discrimination occurred. But a person claiming to be the victim of sexual 
discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection C l ause does have to prove 
that the employer intended to discriminate. The importance of these distinc-
tions will become apparent t o  you as we look at the cases, particularly the 
second one. 
We would be foolish if we did not use the two cases to draw s ome useful 
conclusions about how to handle sexual harassment in the municipal workplace. 
With that fact in mind, we will draw f rom those cases s ome basic lessons that 
municipalities can use to head off cases of sexual harassment, then we will use 
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those lessons t o  draft s ome sample sexual harassment policies which can be 
tailored to Tennessee municipalities . 
WHAT YOU DON'T KNOW CAN HURT YOU 
It is easy to win a battle but lose the war in the courts .  That may be 
what happened to employers, including municipal governments, in Meritor Savings 
Bank v. Vinson, 106 s. C t .  2399 ( 1986). In that case the U . S .  Supreme Court 
decided that employers are not s t rictly (automatically) liable for s exual 
harassment committed by supervisory employees . That sounds l ike good news, but 
the Supreme Court also declared that such cases should be decided on " agency 
principles . "  If that s tatement leaves you s cratching your head, you are in good 
company. Mos t  of the sexual harassment legal eagles were hoping that the 
Supreme Court would use that case to announce some clear principles which would 
guide lower courts in determining when employers are liable for s exual 
harassment committed by their supervisory employees. That was not to be, but 
the Supreme Court did not leave us completely in the dark on that subj ect. In 
fact, the Supreme Court seems to have said quite a bit about the liability of 
employers for sexual harassment in the workplace by all employees. 
First, let ' s  go back to sexual harassment committed by supervisors because 
that was the big issue in Meritor Savings Bank. When are employers l iable for 
sexual harassment committed by supervisory employees? It is a safe bet that 
even after Meritor Savings Bank employers will in many, if not most, cases be 
held l iable for s exual harassment committed by their supervisors, especially 
high-ranking one s .  Call i t  s trict l iability, call i t  liability on agency prin­
ciples, a rose by any other name is s till a rose. The name of the rose is 
employer liability. We will hear more about that shortly. 
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Further comments by the Supreme Court in that case also warn employers that 
if they want to reduce their potential liability for s exual harassment committed 
by all employees they should have sexual harassment policies and complaint 
procedures which root out cases of sexual harassment rather than s imply catching 
them if they happen to go by. 
Another important thing the Supreme Court said was that sexual harassment 
can s till be a violation of Title VII of the C ivil Rights Act of 1964 , even if : 
The the sexual harassment does not lead to an economic loss by the 
person complaining of sexual harassment in the workplace; and 
The person complaining of the s exual harassment participated in the 
sexual conduct which led to the sexual harassment claim, 
Finally , as we said earlie r ,  although this case involved sexual harassment 
of a regular employee by a supervisory employee, much of what the Supreme Court 
said applies to sexual harassment committed by anyone in the workplace , at 
least in cases where the sexual harassment is so pervasive and severe that it 
alters the terms and conditions o f  employment or creates an abusive working 
environment .  
The Facts o f  the Case 
Sorting all of that out requires us to review the facts of Meritor Savings 
Bank; actually , the facts in both cases . The facts o f  the cases are impor-
tant because they remind us that sexual harassment cases represent real 
people involved in real ( and very expensive) legal battles , and they give us a 
sharp focus on the issue of who is responsible for sexual harassment in the 
workplace. Someplace along the way it should strike you that the real people in 
both cases , and the parties responsible for sexual harassment in the workplace , 
could be you and your municipality. As you read about this case, remember that 
what Ms . Vinson accused Mr.  Taylor of doing is extremely important to Mr . Tayl or ' s  
employer because Ms . Vinson wants to ho+d Mr. Taylor' s employer liable for 
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what she said Mr . Taylor did to her, even though Mr. Taylor ' s  employer s ays 
that even if Mr. Taylor did what Ms . Vinson said he did, it didn ' t  know what 
Mr. Taylor was doing to Ms . Vinson. Whew! If that s ounds like a soap opera 
plot, hang on for a minute and you will get the picture. 
In 1974 Sidney Taylor, a vice president and branch manager of what is now 
Meritor Savings Bank, hired Mechelle Vinson as a teller-trainee. Ms . Vinson 
worked for Mr . Taylor for four years.  During that time she received regular 
promotions , reaching the rank of assistant branch manager. It was conceded by 
all the parties that Ms . Vinson received her promotions strictly on the basis of 
merit.  But in 1 9 78 Ms . Vinson told Mr.  Taylor that she was going to take an 
indefinite sick leave. Two months later the bank f ired Ms . Vinson for excessive 
use of s ick leave. Ms . Vinson sued both Mr . Taylor and Meritor Savings Bank, 
alleging that during her entire four years at the bank she had " constantly been 
subj ected to sexual harassment" by Mr . Taylor in violation of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1 9 6 4 .  Why did she sue the bank? When the famous bank 
robber Willie "The Actor" Sutton was asked why he robbed banks , he replied, 
"That ' s  where the money is . "  
During a lengthy trial, Ms.  Vinson testified that 
* Mr . Taylor treated her in a " f atherly way" during her probationary 
period, but shortly afterwards he invited her t o  dinner where he 
suggested they go to a motel for sexual relations. After initially 
refusing, she submi tted to his request out of fear for her j ob. 
* Her submission was followed by repeated demands for further sexual 
favors, and that over the next four years she had sexual intercourse 
with Mr. Taylor 40 or 50 times, both during and after business hours. 
*Mr . Taylor fondled her in the presence of other employees, followed her 
into the restroom when she went there alone, and exposed himself to her . 
* Mr . Taylor forcibly raped her several time s .  
*She never complained o f  Mr . Taylor ' s  sexual harassment to any of 
Mr. Taylor' s supervisors or used the bank ' s  complaint procedure because 
she was afraid of Mr. Taylor. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
r 
I 
I 
I 
1, 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
-7-
Needless to say ,  both Mr. Taylor and the bank argued that none of 
Ms . Vinson ' s  accusations were true. Mr . Taylor contended that M s .  Vinson' s 
allegations were in retaliation for a business-related dispute between them. 
In addition, apparently Mr.  Taylor also testified about Ms . Vinson' s conduct ,  
including her "dress and personal fantasies . "  We are left in the dark about 
that aspect of his tes timony . But the bank also took the alternative position 
that if any sexual harassment was commi tted by Mr . Taylor, it was unknown to the 
bank and engaged in without the bank ' s  consent or approval. 
The District Court's Decision 
The District Court ruled in favor of both Mr . Taylor and the bank. As to 
the accusations against Mr . Taylor , the Court declared that if there was any 
sexual relationship between Mr. Taylor and Ms . Vinson, it was a "voluntary one 
having nothing to do with her continued employment at [ the bank] or her 
advancement o r  promotion at that institution. " The District Court disposed of 
Ms . Vinson ' s  claim against the bank by declaring that the bank had no notice 
of the claimed sexual harassment; therefore, it could not be held liable for the 
alleged actions of Mr . Taylor. 
The District Court never actually resolved the questions of whether 
Mr. Taylor even made sexual advances toward Ms . Vinson, and, i f  he did, whether 
the advances were welcome or unwelcome. As we shall see, the Supreme Court 
thought those questions were important and wanted them answered. 
The Court of Appeals' Decision 
The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court and found both Mr . Taylor 
and the bank liable for the alleged sexual harassment. 
Addressing Ms . Vinson' s  claim against Mr . Taylor , the Court of Appeals 
determined that there are two kinds of sexual harassment: ( 1) harassment that 
makes concrete employment benefits dependent upon sexual favor s ,  and (2) s exual 
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harassment that creates a hostile working environment . In hostile environment 
sexual harassment cases the loss of economic benefits i s  not necessary , 
concluded the Court of Appeals. In other words , Ms . Vinson did not have to 
show that her job or promotions depended upon her submission t o  Mr. Taylor ' s  
alleged sexual advances ,  only that the sexual harassment created a hostile , 
offensive working environment. On the related question of whether Ms . Vinson' s 
participation in the sexual conduct with Mr. Taylor was voluntary, the Court o f  
Appeals concluded that if Mr . Taylor had made Ms. Vinson' s toleration o f  sexual 
harassment a condition of her employment , the voluntariness of her conduct "had 
no materiality whatsoever, "  As to Mr. Taylor ' s  evidence about Ms. Vinson ' s  
manner o f  dress and personal fantasies , such evidence "had no place in this 
litigation, "  said the Court of Appeals .  
On the second poin t ,  the l iability of the bank f o r  Mr . Taylor ' s  conduct ,  
the Court o f  Appeals held t hat an employer i s  s trictly (automatically) liable 
for s exual harassment practices of supervisory employees , whether or not the 
employer knew or should have known about the misconduct. The Court of Appeals 
reasoned that a supervisor is an agent of his employer for Title VII purposes 
even if he lacks the authority to hire, fire, or promote,  since " the mere 
existence - or appearance - of a significant degree of influence in vital j ob 
decisions gives any supervisor the opportunity to impose on employees , "  
The Supreme Court's Decision 
Economic loss of the victim, The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of 
Appeals that a person complaining of sexual harassment in the workplace did not 
have to show an economic los s .  I t s  ruling relied heavily on the Equal 
Employment Opportunity C ommission ' s  Sexual Harassment Guideline s ,  One of those 
guidelines , noted the Supreme C ourt , prohibits sexual harassment where "such 
conduct has the purposes or effect of unreasonably interfering with an 
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individual ' s  work performance or creating an int imidating, hostile or o ffensive 
working environment , "  [Citing 29 CFR 1604. 1 1 ] . That guideline requires no 
showing o f  an economic los s ,  declared the Supreme Court. 
Voluntary participation in s exual conduct. The Supreme Court also agreed 
with the Court of Appeals that a person making a claim of sexual harassment 
does not have to show that his or her participation in the s exual conduct was 
involuntary. Asking whether the s exual relationship is voluntary, in the sense 
that the person complaining of sexual harassment was not forced to participate 
in the sexual conduct against their wil l ,  is not the proper question to ask, 
said the Supreme Court; rather, 
The correct inquiry is whether respondent by her conduct 
indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome , 
not whether her actual participation in sexual intercourse 
was voluntary. [Author's emphasis] 
But because the conduct of the person complaining of sexual harassment is 
"obviously relevant" in determining whether the s exual advances were welcome or 
unwelcome, the District Court was correct in admi tting testimony about Ms. 
Vinson's "sexually provocat ive speech and dres s , "  announced the Supreme Court . 
The level of sexual harassment , While apparently this subj ect was not an 
issue in the District Court or the Court of Appeals , the Supreme Court addressed 
i t .  Not all workplace sexual harassment will result i n  liability, only that 
which is "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the 
victim's employment and create an abusive working environment , "  the Supreme 
Court declared. Needless to say, the Supreme Court also concluded that the 
sexual harassment alleged in this case, if proven, more than met that s tandard, 
The employer's liability for the conduct of its supervisor. The Supreme 
Court and the Court of Appeals parted company on this issue. An employer is not 
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automatically liable for sexual harassment committed by a supervisor, the Court 
decided. Then when is an employer liable for sexual harassment committed by a 
supervisor? "[A]gency principles" should guide courts in answering that 
question, said the Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court sent this case back to the District Court for th� latter 
to determine whether Mr. Taylor made sexual advances toward Ms. Vinson, and, if 
sexual advances were made, whether they were unwelcome, and 
whether they were sufficiently pervasive to constitute a 
condition of employment, or whether they were so pervasive 
and so long continuing • •  , that the employer must have 
become conscious of them," 
Read those four questions again. Carefully, Let us review them because they 
appear to represent the standard for determining whether an employer is liable 
for sexual harassment committed by one of its employees. While this case 
involved sexual harassment alleged to have been committed by a supervisor, it is 
likely that this standard applies to sexual harassment by all employees: 
!. Whether the person who is accused of sexual harassment actually made 
the sexual advances in question; 
2. Whether the sexual advances were unwelcome; 
3. Whether the sexual advances were pervasive enough to constitute a con­
dition of employment; £E_ 
4. Whether the sexual advances were so pervasive and long continuing that 
the employer must have become conscious of them. 
If the answers to the first three questions are all yes or the answers to 
questions l, 2 and 4 are yes, the employer stands a good chance of being stuck 
with the sexual harassment committed by his employees. Let's kick around that 
conclusion for a minute. If the answers to the first three questions are 
all yes, the employer may be liable because submission to sexual harassment 
is part of the job, so to speak, even if the employer doesn't actually know 
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about the s exual harassment. If the answers to questions 1, 2 and 4 are yes , 
the employer is probably liable because employers are generally responsible for 
the wrongful conduct o f  their employees of which they have knowledge. 
What Did He Know and When Did He Know It? 
From what you have read s o  far,  what happens to a municipality ' s  position 
that it knew nothing about the alleged sexual harassment , and that it certainly 
never gave its employees permission to engage in sexual harassment? The fact is 
that under traditional agency principles ,  the courts have long held employers 
liable for the conduct of supervisors ( and regular employees) about which they 
actually knew nothing. Meritor Savings Bank teaches us that if the sexual 
advances in question were either pervasive enough to constitute a condition of 
employment , � so pervasive and long continuing that the employer must have 
become conscious of them, the employer is in hot water. 
Let ' s  talk for a minute about the business of sexual harassment being so 
pervasive and long continuing that the employer must have become conscious of 
it . An employer might be able t o  show that it actually didn' t know about s exual 
harassment that an employee can also show was prevalant and long-lasting. 
Remember the os trich with its head in the sand? Albert Speer , the German 
Minister of Armaments during World War I I ,  accepted moral responsibility for the 
use of millions of s l ave laborers all over Europe to increase German war produc­
tion, but denies that he knew what went on in the concentration camps in which 
the Germans were killing millions of people. But the reason he didn' t know 
what went on in them, he conceded , was because he did not want to know, and took 
great care not to know. He said that a high German official who did know what 
was going on in the camps told him that he should never visit one because what 
was going on in them was horrible. That was good enough for Speer; he &sked no 
further questions . Most of us would agree that Albert Speer was at least 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I; 
I 
1, 
' 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
-12-
partially guilty for what went on in the camps because he s hould have known what 
was going on in them, and, armed with that knowledge and given his position, 
should have done s omething about i t .  
That brings us t o  one o f  those " agency principles" the Supreme Court was 
apparently talking about : constructive knowledge. In the context of employer 
responsibility for the wrongful conduct of its employees, constructive knowledge 
is what an employer should have known about the wrongful conduct i f  it had exer-
cised reasonable diligence. Under agency principles , an employer may be held 
legally liable for the wrongful conduct of its employees about which it had only 
constructive knowledge. When the Supreme Court speaks of s exual harassment of 
which an employer "must have become conscious, "  it is speaking of constructive, 
as well as actual, knowledge· of the sexual harassment. 
Could the bank in this case have known about the alleged sexual harassment 
of M s .  Vinson by Mr . Taylor if it had exercised reasonable diligence? That was 
one of the questions the Supreme Court told the District Court to answer, but 
the Supreme C ourt ' s  criticism of the bank ' s  g rievance procedure and policy 
against discrimination did not give the bank much encouragement on that s core: 
[W]e rej ect petitioner ' s  view that the mere existence of a 
grievance procedure and a policy against discrimination, 
coupled with the respondent ' s  failure to invoke that proce­
dure, must insulate petitioner f rom l iability. While those 
facts are plainly relevan t ,  the s ituation before us 
demonstrates why they are not necessarily dispositive. 
Petitioner ' s  general nondiscrimination policy did not address 
sexual harassment in particular, and thus did not alert 
employees to their employer' s  interest in correcting that 
form of discrimination. Moreover, the bank ' s  grievance 
procedure apparently required an employee to complain first 
to her supervisor, in this case Taylor. Since Taylor was 
the alleged perpetrator, it is not altogether surprising that 
respondent failed to invoke the procedure and report her 
grievance to him. Petitione r ' s contention that respondent ' s  
failure should insulate i t  f rom liability might be substan­
tially stronger if its procedures were be tter calculated to 
encourage victims of harassment to come forward. [Author' s  
emphasi s . ]  
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What you don ' t  know� hurt you. And what you don ' t  know , you better try 
hard to find out where sexual harassment is concerned. 
There are other agency principles the courts routinely use t o  hold an 
employer liable for the wrongful conduct of its employees; we merely skimmed the 
surface of them to explain part of what the Supreme Court said in Meritor 
Savings Bank. Sometimes the same agency principles can even be used to 
exonerate an employer for the wrongful conduct of its employees. However ,  take 
it on f aith that generally agency principles are used to impose liability on 
employers for the wrongful actions of their employees , not to protect them f rom 
such liability . And the higher the rank of an employee, the more likely it is 
that an employer will be held liable for his actions . From an actual or 
constructive knowledge s tandpoint , the closer an employee is to the top of the 
heap , the greater the likelihood that the employer knows about his conduct. 
Employers may not technically be automatically liable for sexual harassraent 
committed by their supervisor s ,  but that technicality probably will not protect 
most employers . As we have seen, employers may also be liable for sexual 
harassment committed by regular employees .  
WHAT YOU DO KNOW CAN HURT YOU TOO 
Remember that in Meritor Savings Bank, Ms . Vinson ' s  sexual harassment suit 
rested on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Most sexual harassment 
suits are brought under that law. But in Bohen v. C ity of East Chicago, 
Indiana, 799 F . 2d 1 1 80 ( 7 th Cir. 1 9 86),  the U . S .  Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit recently declared that intentional sexual harassment is also 
a violation of the Equal Protection C l ause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
U . S .  Constitution. ( In looking at this case we will not review the holding of 
the U . S .  District Court which heard the case as we did in Meritor Savings Bank . )  
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Hortencia Bohen, a Hispanic woman who worked for over four years as a 
dispatcher in the C i ty of East C hicago Fire Departmen t ,  was f i red for being a 
rotten employee. She was , according to the C ourt of Appeals , 
a chronic complainer,  given to obstreperous conduct, personal 
grievances , and tempermental outbursts of anger directed 
towards her fellow employees and superiors . She spread rumors 
about them. She made f requent unsupported accusations 
against others , including allegations of violent physical 
abuse. She even brought unfounded criminal charges against 
superior s .  I n  shor t ,  although Bohen was competent a t  the 
fundamentals of her job ( relaying information regarding f ires 
and dispatching the proper equipment), she was less than a 
model employee when it came to getting along with fellow 
workers , especially her superiors. 
Sounds like the C i t y  of East Chicago not only won that case, but should have 
gotten a medal for getting rid of an obnoxious troublemaker ,  doesn' t it? And 
indeed, the Court of Appeals· did determine that Ms . Bohen had been fired for 
good cause, not , as she alleged, because she was a woman, or a Hispanic, or in 
retaliation for her earlier filing of a complaint of discrimination with the 
Equal E mployment Opportunities Commission. Because she was f ired for good 
cause, Ms . Bohen had not made a case of sexual harassment under Ti tle V I I ,  
reasoned the Court of Appeals .  
But you know the city didn' t win this case or we wouldn' t  be talking 
about i t .  Remember the distinction we drew between cases brought under 
Title VII and cases brought under the Equal Protection C l ause? Ms . Bohen was 
dismissed for good cause s o  she isn ' t  entitled to restoration of her j ob, back 
pay and other equitable remedies . That i s  all she can get under Title V I I .  
But i f  Ms . Bohen is the victim o f  sexual harassment,  how is the Court of Appeals 
going to help her? By turning to the U . S .  Constitution. If Ms . Bohen can make 
a case of intentional discrimination, she is entitled to damages f or the 
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violation of her constitutional rights . Now let ' s  see if Ms . Bohen can make a 
claim of intentional discrimination. 
M s .  Bohen, as thoroughly obnoxious as she apparently was ,  was the victim of 
equally obnoxious sexual harassment. In fac t ,  before she took the dispatcher' s 
job,  Ms . Bohen was warned by the fire chief that firefighters were "kind of 
nasty" and would " t ry anything. "  Then the fire chief put the burden on Ms. Bohen 
to handle the sexual harassment by telling her not to socialize with the men, 
not enter the apparatus room, and that she must "cover herself from head to toe . "  
The abuse Ms . Bohen endured would make a sailor blush, but it is cataloged 
here, in the langauage of the Court of Appeals , because it represents treatment 
that almost anyone would agree is sexual harassment. On her first night on the 
j ob ( she worked the graveyard shift) Ms . Bohen took a short nap . She awoke to 
find the senior dispatcher ' s  hands pressed against her crotch. The same 
dispatcher ,  who later became the Head Dispatcher and Bohen ' s  immediate super-
visor, constantly talked to her exclusively about sexual activities , including 
his preferred sexual positions and about Ms . Bohen' s  participation in his 
sexual daydreams . But the senior dipatcher ' s  conduct was not limited to verbal 
exercises . He also would rub his pelvis against her rear when she s tood and 
would spread his legs in such a manner that he was always touching her when she 
sat . He also forced her to leave the door open when she used the bathroom. 
Ms . Bohen endured s imilar conduct from other firefighters . They made her 
the constant target of obscene comments ,  including descriptions of their s exual 
fantasies in which she was the obj ect . One captain told her that being forcibly 
raped in a nearby plant arrangement would improve her disposition. Her "cool 
reception" to the the firefighters ' frequent invitations to engage in deviate 
sexual activities was met by implications that she was a lesbian. 
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Ms. Bohen made numerous complaints about the sexual harassment to her superiors ,  
but nothing was ever done. The Fire Department did not even have a written 
policy against sexual harassment until after Ms . Bohen was fired. 
Ms . Bohen was not the sole target of similar conduct by male firefighters , 
only their favorite targe t .  Other female dispatchers endured the s ame kind of 
conduct ,  some of it worse than what Bohen endured. 
Ms. Bohen's Constitutional Claim 
Although Bohen' s Title V I I  complaint was dismissed, she had also sued under 
Section 1983 on the grounds that the sexual harassment to which she was sub-
j ected was sexual discrimination in violation of her constitutional right of 
equal protection of the laws . The Court of Appeals agreed with her. The core 
of any equal protection case· is intentional discrimination , but intentional 
discrimination in sexual harassment cases can be shown by the "conscious failure 
of the employer to protect its employees f rom sexual harassment by other 
employees , "  declared the Court of Appeals .  Ms . Bohen had been warned by the 
fire chief that she would be the victim of of sexual harassment, was the victim 
of sexual harassment , had complained repeatedly and unsuccessfully about the 
harassment , and there was no written policy against sexual harassment • .  It was 
not necessary that other women also be the victim of sexual harassment to show 
that the harassment was intentional discrimination, but " [ e ] vidence of a pattern 
or practice of discrimination , however, is of course s trong evidence supporting 
a plaintiff ' s  claim that she herself has been the victim of discrimination, "  
concluded the Court of Appeal s .  It  is difficult to think o f  a better case than 
this one of intentional discrimination based on those s tandards . 
The legal basis for the Court of Appeal ' s  decision in this case is that 
female employees were being subjected to abusive conditions to which male 
-17-
employees were not subjected! The difference in t reatment constituted discrim-
ination. And the discrimination didn' t j ust happen without anybody really 
meaning for it to happen; women were intentionally subjected to abusive 
conditions to which men were not subjected. That doesn' t mean that the C i ty of 
East Chicago told the female dispatchers in the fire department "Ok , part of 
your j ob is to take daily sexual harassment between the hours of 1 1:00 P . M .  and 
7 :00 A.M. the next day . "  What i t  means i s  that high-ranking city officials knew 
women dispatchers in the f i re department were subject to s exual harassment , and 
did nothing to protect them. Worse than that , the same city officials put the 
burden on the women dispatchers to protect themselves . 
The City is Liable for the Sexual Harassment 
Keep in mind that Bohen·sued the City of East Chicago, not the individual 
members of the f i re department who sexually harassed her. Why? The city has 
more money than do the firemen. The C ourt of Appeals had no trouble finding the 
city liable for the s exual harassment committed by its employees. Under 
Section 1 983 ,  a municipality may be held liable for the unconstitutional actions 
of i t s  employees if those act ions represent the policy or custom of the 
municipality. The Court of Appeals pointed out several ways the practices of 
employees become the policy or custom of a municipality. Read them carefully. 
1. A single act of a sufficiently high-ranking policy maker i s  sufficient 
to establish an entity ' s  .policy or custom. 
2. A policy or custom may also be established by proving that the conduct 
complained of is a ' well-settled • • •  practice • • •  even though such a 
custom has not received formal approval through the body ' s  decision­
making channels . '  
3 .  Practices of s tate [ including municipal] officials could be so 
permanent and well-settled as to constitute a ' cus tom or usage ' with 
the force of law. 
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4. An entity may be l iable even for 'informal actions , if they reflect a 
general policy , custom or pattern of official conduct which even 
tacitly encourages conduct depriving citizens of their constitutionally­
protected rights. '  
From there the Court of Appeals concluded that the C i ty of East Chicago was 
liable for the sexual harassment committed by its employees because 
individual acts of harassment were engaged in by super­
visory personnel in the course of their supervisory dutie s .  
Other management officials responsible for working conditions 
'knew the general picture if not the details ' of the pattern 
of sexual harassment. • • Complaints by the victims of sexual 
harassment were addressed superficially if at all, and the 
department had no policy against sexual harassment. In sum ,  
sexual harassment was the general on-going, and accepted 
practice at the East Chicago Fire Department, and high-ranking 
supervisory, and management officials responsible for working 
conditions at the department knew of , tolerated, and par­
ticipated in the harassment. This s atisfies § 1983 ' s  
requirement that the actions complained of be the policy or 
custom of the s t ate· entity. [Author ' s  emphasis] 
Do not tolerate the sexual harassment of any employee, even rotten ones. 
It is hazardous to your municipali ty ' s  health if the employee can show that your 
municipality had a policy or custom of s exual harassment. Keep in mind that a 
policy or custom of sexual harassment was shown in this case, in part , by the 
knowledge and participation of supervisory personnel in the sexual harassment 
and the lack of a written policy against sexual harassment . 
ALL ROADS LEAD TO ROME 
As you can see,  the federal courts can get to essentially the same place i n  
a sexual harassment case under both Title VII and the U . S .  Constitution. Once 
sexual harassment i s  shown, the only question is whether the victim is entitled 
to j ob restoration, back pay and other equitable relief under Title VII,  or 
damages under the U . S .  Constitution through Section 1 983. Showing an intention 
to discriminate is crucial to winning a sexual harassment suit under the U . S .  
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Constitution, while no intention to discriminate need be shown in a sexual 
harassment suit brought under Title VII.  But think back over everything you 
have read, then ask yourself whether making a case of sexual harassment 
against an employer would be all that difficult to do, under either Title VII 
or the Equal Protect ion C l ause . You are right, making a case would not be that 
difficult where sexual harassment in the workplace exists to any significant 
degree, even in cases where it does not reach the level we saw in Meritor 
Savings Bank and Bohen, especially where the s exual harassment is committed or 
tolerated by supervisory employees . 
WHAT ABOUT SEXUAL HARASSMENT COMM ITTED BY ELECTED OFFIC IALS? 
Apparently sexual harassment complaints against elected officials are not 
common. However ,  what would be the prospect of a municipality avoiding l iab-
ility under either Title VII or the Equal Protection Clause if the sexual 
harassment was committed by an elected official? Probably about the s ame as a 
Russian Army private trying to get out of K . P .  Elected officials are probably 
ultimate supervisors and policy-makers whether the court is deciding the 
question of municipal liability on agency principles or on the basis of munic-
ipal custom and practice. A particular problem many municipalities might face 
in this area is the lack of effective sanctions to discipline their own elected 
officials . Generally , the broad range of sanctions which most municipalities 
can impose upon their employees for misconduct of various kinds , cannot be 
imposed upon elected officials .  Where effective municipal sanctions against 
elected offials do not exis t ,  that fact is probably an additional invitation t o  
the courts to hold the municipality liable f o r  s exual harassment where an 
elected official is the villian. We have seen that the federal courts will even 
invent a remedy for sexual harassment if one doesn' t exist .  
r }! 
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LESSONS TO BE LEARNED 
1 .  A person complaining of "hos tile environment " sexual harassment under 
Title VII,  does not have to prove an economic loss arising from the sexual 
harassment; that is , that the person lost a j ob, did not get the promotion, etc. 
Right here is a good place to point out what kinds of conduct are sexual 
harassment. For Title VII purpos e s ,  according to the Equal Employment 
Opportunities Commission ' s  Guidelines on Sexual Harassment "unwelcome sexual 
advances , requests for sexual favors and other verbal or physical conduct of a 
sexual nature" constitutes s exual harassment when: 
a.  Submission to such conduct is  made either explicitly or implicitly 
a term or condition of employment; 
b. Submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used 
as the basis for decisions affecting such individual; and 
c .  Such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering 
with an individual ' s  work performance or creating an intimidating, 
hostile , or offensive working environment . "  (Section 1 604. 1 1 )  
[Author's emphasis) 
The same basic general definitions probably apply to sexual harassment cases 
brought on any grounds even if they are not specifically cited. 
But let us be more specific in defining what conduct can constitute sexual 
harassment for both Title VII and Equal Protection purposes . One of the 
problems in doing so is that what is sexual harassment to one person is merely 
wholesome humor to another. Probably everyone would agree that s exual assaul t ,  
making a job or promotion dependent upon having sexual relations with the bos s ,  
or being subjected t o  unwanted grabs and pats i s  sexual harassment , but move 
beyond those forms of conduct to off-color j okes and comments about appearance , 
and there would be less agreement. What sexual harassment is s ometimes depends 
upon whether one is dishing out or taking the conduct in question. For that 
reason, no definition of sexual harassment will satisfy everyone. But that 
�i I 
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reason alone is precisely why a definition is required--to establish s tandards 
of conduct which apply to every employee regardless of their individual percep-
tions about sexual harassment , 
Here are two s impl e ,  but good definitions that address most of the f orms of 
conduct often described as s exual harassment: 
- Sexual harassment i s  unwelcome conduct in the form of pinching, 
grabbing , patting, propositioning; making either explicit or 
implied j ob threats or promises in return for submission t o  
sexual favors; making inappropriate s ex-oriented comments o n  
appearance, including dress o r  physical features; telling 
embarrassing sex-oriented s tories; d isplaying sexually explicit 
or pornographic material, whether printed, written or drawn; or 
sexual assaults on the j ob by supervisors , fellow employees , or 
on occasion, non-employees -- any of which unwelcome conduct 
affects employment decisions , makes the j ob environment 
hostile , dis tracting, or unreasonably interferes with work per­
formance. 
- Sexual harassment is behavior with s exual content or overtones 
that is unwelcome and personally offensive. It can consist of 
sexually oriented "kidding" or j okes , physical contact such as 
patting, pinching or purposely rubbing up against another 
person ' s  body , demands or requests for sexual favors tied to 
promises of better treatment or threats concerning employment , 
discriminating against an employee for refusing to "give in" to 
demands or requests for s exual favors , or rewarding or granting 
favors to one who submits to demands or requests for sexual 
favors . 
2. The focus in sexual harassment cases under Title VII will be on whether 
the sexual conduct complained of was unwelcome , not whether the person 
' 
complaining of sexual harassment voluntarily participated in the conduct or 
went along with it, Think about that s tandard for a minute and you will see 
that all employees should be very careful i n  their speech and "body language , "  
because they may be unwelcome even if the audience at whom they are directed 
appears to voluntarily go along with them or does not object to them, That goes 
for sexual conduct toward fellow workers off as well as on the j ob if it creates 
an offensive or hostile working environment on the j ob. 
,_L· 
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3. In theory , employers will not be held automatically liable for sexual 
harassment by supervisors under Title VII. However ,  a municipality may be held 
liable under Title VII for sexual harassment that it neither permitted nor knew 
abou t ,  but should have known about and s topped if it had exercised diligence. 
In any event , the result of courts applying agency principles to cases involving 
sexual harassment by supervisors will probably s till be the same in most case s :  
employer liability. In addition, municipalities may also be liable for sexual 
harassment committed by regular personnel if the harassment is bad enough or has 
gone on long enough to give the municipality either actual or constructive 
knowledge of i t .  
In that connection, do not relax because the Supreme Court said that for 
sexual harassment to be actionable under Title VII, i t  has to be sufficiently 
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and 
create an abusive working environment . In fact , that standard is a lanti mine 
waiting for an employer to step on i t .  I t  i s  an invitation to both supervisors 
and regular employees to assume that a l ittle bit of s exual harassment is okay . 
The problem i s  that recent s exual harassment cases suggest. that the line be-
tween okay and not okay i s  easy to cros s .  I n  addition, i f  the person ,· 
complaining of sexual harassment in the workplace can show that the sexual 
harassment crossed the line ,  it is a shor t ,  easy step for a court to find that 
it was a term or condition of employment , or that the employer had actual or 
constructive knowledge of the harassment , or that it was intentional harassment 
within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . 
4.  A municipality is l iable under Section 1 9 83 for intentional sexual 
harassment commi tted by its employees in violation of the Equal Protection 
' . . 
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U. S .  Cons titution, if the municipality 
has a policy or custom of sexual harassment. A policy or custom can be shown by 
the conscious failure of the municipality to protect i ts employees from sexual 
harassment, The failure of high-ranking supervisors who know that sexual 
harassment i s  occurring to do anything to stop the harassment is good evidence 
of a conscious failure of the municipality to protect its employees from sexual 
harassment. 
5. An important key in sexual harassment cases under both Title V II and the 
Equal Protection Clause is supervision. If supervisors are participating in 
the sexual harassment, don't know that it is going on when they should know, o r  
permit it t o  g o  o n  when they know i t  exists , the municipality will be held 
liable for the sexual harassment , especially if the supervisors are high-ranking 
supervisors . 
6 .  T o  minimize the possibility o f  being held liable for sexual harassment 
committed by all their personnel ,  including supervisors ,  under both Title VII 
and the Equal Protection Claus e ,  municipalities should issue and widely 
publicize a written policy specifically against sexual harassment in the 
workplace . Make sure the policy clearly: 
- Defines s exual harassment in broad enough language to cover 
the forms of conduct that are generally recognized to be sexual 
harassment, yet is specific enough to give employees notice of 
prohibited forms of conduct. 
Prohibits sexual harassment by regular and supervisory 
employees , including elected official s .  
- Contains a complaint procedure which permi ts a n  employee t o  go around 
and above a supervisor against whom the employee wants to make a 
complaint of sexual harassment . 
Emphatically encourages employees with a complaint of sexual 
harassment to come forward with the complaint • 
" ' 
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It would be a good practice to require all employees and supervisors to 
sign a statement that they have read and understand the written policy against 
sexual harassment of employees in the workplace , and keep a copy of the signed 
policy in its records . A good place for this statement to appear is at the 
conclusion of the written policy itsel f .  
Appendices A and B contain sample s exual harassment policies and complaint 
procedures for mayor-aldermanic and city manager forms of government , respec-
tively . They can be modified to fit the special requirements of particular 
municipalities , and municipalities with other forms of government . 
7 .  Regularly t rain both supervisors and employees in the contents of the 
written policy prohibiting s exual harassment in the workplace, and keep a record 
of the training and the attendance of each supervisor and employee. The 
training of supervisors in particular should emphasize the high potential for 
liability for supervisors ' conduct being transferred to the municipality . 
8. Prohibit a policy or custom of sexual harassment of employees by super-
visory or regular employees . Remember that a written prohibition against sexual 
harassment is no good if policy or custom permits what the written policy pro-
hibits. In other words , make sure that what you prohibit in writing, ,you prohi-
bit in practice. 
9 .  Discipline supervisors and employees who engage in sexual harassment in 
the workplace . Keep a record of the conduct complained o f ,  and the discipline 
dispensed. However, be careful to insure that the complaint of s exual 
harassment is thoroughly investigated and that the person against whom the 
complaint is lodged is guilty of sexual harassment. The supervisor or employee 
against whom a complaint of sexual harassment has been made has rights too. 
... ' 
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Making sure that the complaint of sexual harassment is founded before 
disciplinary action i s  taken puts an enormous burden on the employer in some 
cases. It is not always easy to determine whether certain sexual relationships 
are unwelcome , including those which may be going on after work hours but which 
affect the working environment. A particular problem in that regard is that a 
sexual relat ionship which was welcome yesterday, may not be welcome today • 
When disciplinary action is taken, make sure "the punishment fits the 
crime . "  Discipline can range from a verbal reprimand to dismissal, depending 
upon the nature of the sexual harassment . In all cases insure that the 
dis ciplinary procedures called for in the municipality's charter, ordinances , 
resolut ions or other regulations , are followed. 
Needless to say ,  an employer walks a tightrope in some cases where 
balancing the rights of the person doing the complaining and the person against 
whom the complaint is made is a close question. 
Do not hesitate to consult an attorney. 
APPENDIX A 
SAMPLE SEXUAL HARASSMENT POLICY FOR MUNICIPALITIES 
WITH A MAYOR-ALDERMANIC FORM OF GOVERNMENT 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT POLICY* 
[Important Note:  This sample policy reflects general considerations which 
should go into drafting a policy against sexual harassment. The s exual 
harassment policy for a particular municipality should take into consideration 
the municipality's type of government , who in the municipality has the authority 
to supervise and discipline employees ,  the employee chain of command, and which 
employees would do a good j ob of receiving and investigating complaints of 
sexual harassment. Those considerations , and others peculiar to individual 
municipalities , are important for making sure that the s exual harassment policy 
conforms to the personnel system in the municipality and that the policy works 
when a complaint of sexual harassment i s  made. This policy is written as if the 
city had a mayor-aldermanic form of government in which the mayor has limited 
disciplinary authority, a common form of government in Tennessee. The policy 
can be modified to reflect the wants and needs of particular municipalities , 
including those with other forms of government ] .  
SEXUAL HARASSMENT IS ABSOLUTELY PROHIBITED 
The sexual harassment of any employee of the City of 
�.,.--�-,---,:--�����-by any other employee or non-employee i s  demeaning to both the victim 
of the harassment and to the city. It can result in high turnover, absenteeism, 
low morale, and an uncomfortable work environment. Some forms of sexual 
harassment , including certain kinds of unwelcome physical contac t ,  may also be 
criminal offenses . The city will not tolerate the s exual harassment of any of 
its employees , and will take immediate, positive steps to s top i t  when i t  
occurs . 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT IS ILLEGAL AND EXPENSIVE 
Sexual harassment is a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 . In some cases i t  has been f ound to be a violation of the victim's U . S .  
Constitutional rights . In some states i t  has been held to be a violation of 
state s tatutory and common law. Successful sexual harassment suits are common 
and almost always result in money being awarded the victim no matter what legal 
grounds exist for the sui t .  Even in sexual harassment suits in which municipal­
ities are successful , the costs of defense are extremely high. 
It is not the purpose of this policy to outline the legal grounds for 
sexual harassment complaints and suits in Tennessee. It  is sufficient to say 
that legal grounds exist i n  every s tate in both federal and state courts , and 
that sexual harassment suits are costly whether they are won or los t .  
*The masculine gender is used i n  this policy only f or grammatical 
clarity and convenience. 
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WHAT IS SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
- Sexual harassment is unwelcome conduct in the form of pinching , 
grabbing , patting, propositioning; making either explicit or 
implied j ob threats or promises in return for submission to 
sexual favors ;  making inappropriate sex-oriented comments on 
appearance , including dress or physical features;  telling 
embarrassing sex-oriented s tories;  displaying s exually explicit 
or pornographic material, no matter how it is displayed; or 
sexual assaul ts on the j ob by supervisors ,  fellow employees , or 
on occasion, non-employees-- when any of such of the foregoing 
unwelcome conduct affects employment decisions , makes the j ob 
environment hostile , distracting , or unreasonably interferes 
with work performance . 
[alternatively , the following or some other suitable definition] 
- Sexual harassment is behavior with sexual content or overtones 
that is unwelcome and personally offensive. It can consist of 
sexually oriented "kidding" or j okes ; physical contact such as 
patting, pinching or purposely rubbing up against another 
person' s  body; demands or requests for sexual favors tied . to 
promises of better treatment or threats concerning employment; 
discriminating against an employee for refusing to "give in" to 
demands or requests for s exual favors ;  or rewarding or granting 
favors to one who submits to demands or requests for sexual 
favors .  
The definition of sexual harassment includes conduct directed by men toward 
women ,  conduct directed by men toward men, conduct directed by women toward 
men, and conduct by women toward women. 
COVERAGE AND DISTRIBUTION OF POLICY 
This sexual harassment policy applies to all officers and employe�s of the 
City of , including , but not limited to,  
full and part-time employees , elected officials , permanent and temporary 
employee s ,  employees covered or exempted from personnel rules or regulations , 
and employees working under contract for the city. 
This policy will be distributed to all officials and employees of the city. 
Every official and employee will be required to acknowledge his or her receipt 
of this policy in writing. A copy of that acknowledgement shall be kept on per­
manent file in the city. Department heads and supervisors shall also be respon­
sible for insuring that all employees under their direction are familiar with 
this policy. 
MAKING SEXUAL HARASSMENT COMPLAINTS 
Any employee who feels he or she is being subjected to sexual harassment 
should immediately contact one of the persons below with whom the employee feels 
the most comfortable. C omplaints may be made orally or in writing to: 
( 
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1. The employee's immediate supervisor. 
2. The employee 's department head. 
3 .  The city's equal employment opportunity officer. 
4 .  The city recorder. 
5 .  The mayor. 
Employees have the right to circumvent the employee chain of command in 
selecting which person to whom to make a complaint of sexual harassment. 
Regardless of to which of the above persons the employee makes a complaint 
of sexual harassment , the employee should be prepared to provide the following 
information : 
- Official's or employee's name, department and position title. 
- The name of the person or persons committ ing the s exual harassment, 
including their title/ s ,  if known. 
- The specific nature of the s exual harassment , how long it has gone on, 
and any employment action (demotion, failure to promote, dismissal, 
refusal to hire, transfer, e tc . )  taken agains t you as a result of the 
harassment , or any other threats made agains t you as a result of the 
harassment. 
- Witnesses to the harassment. 
- Whether you have previously reported such harassment and, if so, when and 
to whom. 
REPORTING AND INVESTIGATION OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT COMPLAINTS ' 
Against Employees 
The city recorder is the person designated by the city to be the investiga­
tor of complaints of sexual harassment against employees . In the event the 
sexual harassment complaint is against the city recorder, the investigator shall 
be a municipal employee appointed by the mayor. 
When an allegation of sexual harassment is made by any employee, the person 
to whom the complaint is made shall immediately prepare a report of the 
complaint according to the preceding s ection and submit it to the city recorder ,  
or in the event the sexual harassment complaint i s  against the city recorder ,  t o  
the mayor. 
l 
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The investigator shall make and keep a written record of the investigation, 
including notes of verbal responses made to the investigator by the person 
complaining of sexual harassmen t ,  witnesses interviewed during the investiga­
tion, the person against whom the complaint of sexual harassment was made, and 
any other person contacted by the investigator in connection with the investiga­
tion. The notes shall be made at the time the verbal interview is in progress .  
When the investigator receives a complaint of sexual harassment, he or she 
shall immediately : 
- Obtain a written statement from the person complaining of sexual 
harassment which includes a comprehensive report of the nature of the 
sexual harassment complained of, and the times , date s ,  and places where 
the s exual harassment occurred. The investigator shall verbally question 
the person complaining of sexual harassment about any information in the 
written s tatement which is not clear or needs amplification. 
- Obtain written s tatements from witnesses which include a comprehensive 
report of the nature of the conduct witnessed, and the times , dates , and 
places where the conduct occurred, and the conduct of the person 
complaining of s exual harassment toward the person against whom the 
complaint of sexual harassment was made. The investigator shall 
verbally question witnesses about any information in their written 
statements which is not clear or needs amplification. 
- Obtain a written s tatement from the person against whom the complaint of 
sexual harassment has been made. The investigator shall verbally 
question the person against whom the complaint of sexual harassment has 
been made about any information in the written statement which is not 
clear or needs amplification. 
- Prepare a report of the investigation, which includes the written 
statement of the person complaining of sexual harassment , the written 
statements of witnesses , the written statement of the person against whom 
the complaint of sexual harassment was made, and all the inves'tigator 's 
notes connected to the investigation, and submit the report to the mayor. 
Against an Elected Official 
Complaints of s exual harassment against elected officials shall be investi­
gated by a city employee appointed by the board of mayor and aldermen. 
The investigator shall investigate the complaint against an elected offi­
cial in the same manner as i s  outlined in this policy for the investigation of 
complaints against employees . However, upon the completion of the investiga­
tion, the i�vestigator shall submit the report of the investigation to the board 
of mayor and aldermen. 
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ACTION ON COMPLAINTS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
Against an Employee 
Upon receipt of a report of the investigation of a complaint of sexual 
harassment against an employee, the mayor shall immediately review the report. 
If the mayor determines that the report is not complete in some respec t ,  he may 
question the person complaining o f  sexual harassment ,  the person against whom 
the complaint of sexual harassment has been made , witnesses to the conduct in 
question or any other person who may have knowledge about the conduct in 
question. The mayor shall also keep written records of his investigation in the 
same manner prescribed for the investigator. However, if the mayor feels the 
inves tigation report is adequate he may make a determination of whether sexual 
harassment occurred, based on the repor t .  
Based upon the report ,  and his own investigation, where one i s  made, the 
mayor shall,  within a reasonable time, determine whether the conduct of the per­
son against whom a complaint of sexual harassment has been made constitutes 
sexual harassment. In making that determination, the mayor shall look at the 
record as a whole and at the totality of circumstances ,  including the nature of 
the conduct in question, the context in which the conduct, if any, occurred, and 
the conduct of the person complaining of sexual harassment .  The determination 
of whether sexual harassment· occurred will be made on a case-by-case basis . 
If the mayor determines that the complaint of sexual harassment is founded , 
he shall take immediate and appropriate disciplinary action against the 
employee guilty of s exual harassment , consistent with his authority under the 
municipal charter, ordinances or rules governing his authority to discipline 
employees .  I f  the mayor feels that disciplinary action stronger than he is 
authorized to impose by the charter, ordinances ,  resolutions or rules governing 
employee discipline is warranted, he shall make that determination known to the 
board of mayor and aldermen, together with the report of the investigation. If 
the board of mayor and aldermen determines that the complaint of sexual 
harassment was founded, it may discipline the employee consistent with its 
authority under the municipal charter , ordinances , resolutions or rules 
governing employee discipline. 
The disciplinary action shall be consistent with the nature and severity of 
the offense,  the rank of the employee , and any other factors the board of mayor 
and aldermen believe relate to fair and efficient administration of the city, 
including , but not limited t o ,  the effect of the offense on employee morale and 
public perception of the offense ,  and the light in which it casts the city. The 
disciplinary action may include demotion, suspension, dismissal , warning or 
reprimand. A determination of the level of disciplinary action shall also be 
made on a case-by-case basis . 
A written record of disciplinary action taken shall be kept , including 
verbal reprimand s .  
) 
� 
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In all events , an employee f ound guilty of sexual harassment shall be 
warned not t o  retaliate in any way against the · person making the complaint of 
sexual harassment , witnesses or any other person connected with the investiga­
tion of the complaint of sexual harassment . 
In cases where the sexual harassment is committed by a non-employee against 
a city employee in the workplace, the mayor shall take whatever lawful action 
against the non-employee is necessary to bring the sexual harassment to an imme­
diate end. 
Against an Elected Official 
The board of mayor and aldermen may discipline an elected official in 
whatever manner it deems appropriate, consistent with its authority under s tate 
law, the municipal charter, ordinances , resolutions or other rules governing 
discipline o f  elected officials. 
OBLIGATION OF EMPLOYEES 
Employees are not only encouraged to report instances of sexual harassment , 
they are obligated t o  report ins tances o f  sexual harassment. Sexual harassment 
exposes the city to liability, and a part of each employee ' s  j ob is to reduce 
the city ' s  exposure to liability. 
Employees are obligated to cooperate in every investigation of sexual 
harassment. The obligation includes , but is not necessarily limited to,  coming 
forward with evidence , both favorable and unfavorable, to a person accused of 
sexual harassment , fully and truthfully making a written report or verbally 
answering questions when required to do so by an investigator during the course 
of an investigation of sexual harassment. 
Employees are also obligated to refrain from making bad faith accusations 
of sexual harassment . 
Disciplinary action may also be 'taken against any employee who fails to 
report instances of s exual harassment , or who fails or refuses to cooperate in 
the investigation of a complaint of sexual harassment ,  or who files a complaint 
of s exual harassment in bad faith. 
OPEN RECORDS 
The Tennessee Open Records Law at Tennessee Code Annotated, Section 
10-7-503 through 10-7-506 probably applies to the records in sexual harassment 
cases , as it does to virtually all other municipal records . In other words , 
complaints and reports of sexual harassment , including the investigative report ,  
probably cannot be kept confidential, perhaps not even during the investiga­
tion. However,  the value of written records in sexual harassment cases , as in 
most other cases where an investigation occurs from which disciplinary action 
against an employee might arise, requires that a written record of the investi­
gation be kept to help insure justice and efficient municipal administration. 
APPENDIX B 
SAMPLE SEXUAL HARASSMENT POLICY FOR MUNICIPALITIES 
WITH THE CITY MANAGER FORM OF GOVERNMENT 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT POLICY* 
[ Important Note: This sample policy reflects general considerations which 
should go into drafting a policy against s exual harassment. The sexual 
harassment policy for a particular municipality should take into consideration 
the municipality ' s  type of government , who in the municipality has the authority 
to supervise and discipline employees , the employee chain of command, and which 
employees would do a good j ob o f  receiving and investigating complaints of 
sexual harassment . Those consideration s ,  and others peculiar to individual 
municipalities , are important for making sure that the s exual harassment policy 
conforms to the personnel system in the municipality and that the policy works 
when a complaint o f  sexual harassment is made. This policy is written as if the 
city had a city manager form o f  government in which the city manager has broad 
disciplinary authority, The policy can be modified to fit the needs and wants 
of particular municipalities , including those with other forms of government , ]  
SEXUAL HARASSMENT IS ABOLUTELY PROHIBITED 
The s exual harassment of any employee of the C i ty o f  �����������­
by any other employee or non-employee is demeaning to both the victim 
of the harassment and to the city. It can result in high turnover, absenteeism, 
low morale, and uncomfortable work environment. Some forms of sexual 
harassment , including certain kinds of unwelcome physical contact , may also be 
criminal offenses . The city will not tolerate the sexual harassment of any of 
its employees , and will take immediate,  positive s teps to s top it when i t  
occurs . 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT IS ILLEGAL AND EXPENSIVE 
Sexual harassment is a violation of Title VII o f  the Civil Rights Act of 
1 9 6 4 .  In some cases it has been f ound to be a violation o f  the victim ' s  U . S .  
Constitutional rights , I n  some s tates i t  has been held t o  be a violation of 
state s tatutory and common law. Successful sexual harassment suits are common 
and almost always resul t in money being awarded the victim no matter what legal 
grounds exist for the suit. Even in s exual harassment suits in which municipa­
lities are successful , the costs of defense are extremely high. 
It is not the purpose of this policy to outline the legal grounds for 
sexual harassment complaints and suits in Tennessee. I t  is sufficient to say 
that legal grounds exist in every s tate in both federal and s tate courts , and 
that s exual harassment suits are costly whether they are won or lost,  
WHAT I S  SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
- Sexual harassment is unwelcome conduct in the form o f  pinching , 
grabbing, patting, propositioning; making either explicit or 
implied j ob threats or promises in return for submission to 
* The masculine gender is used in this policy only for grammatical 
clarity and convenience. 
""'"' 
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sexual favors; making inappropriate sex-oriented comments on 
appearance , including dress or physical features; telling 
embarrassing sex-oriented s tories ; displaying sexually explicit 
or pornographic material, no matter how it is displayed; or 
sexual assaults on the j ob by supervisors , fellow employees , or 
on occasion, non-employees -- when any of the foregoing unwelcome 
conduct affects employment decisions , makes the j ob environment 
hostile ,  d i stracting, or unreasonably interferes with work 
performance. 
[alternatively , the following or some other suitable definition] 
Sexual harassment is behavior with sexual content or overtones 
that is unwelcome and personally offensive. It can consist of 
sexually oriented "kidding" or j okes ;  physical contact such as 
patting, pinching or purposely rubbing up against another 
person ' s  body; demands or requests for sexual favors tied to 
promises of better treatment or threats concerning employment; 
discriminating against an employee for refusing to "give in" to 
demands or requests f or s exual favors; or rewarding or granting 
favors to one who submits to demands or requests for sexual 
favors . 
The definition o f  sexual harassment includes conduct directed by men toward 
women, conduct directed by men toward men, conduct directed by women toward 
men, and conduct by women toward women, 
COVERAGE AND DISTRIBUTION OF POLICY 
This sexual harassment policy applies to all officers and employees of the 
City of , including, but not limited to, 
full and part-time employees , elected official s ,  permanent and temporary 
employee s ,  employees covered or exempted f rom personnel rules or regulations , 
and employees working under contract for the city. 
This policy will be dis tributed to all employees of the city, Every 
employee will be required to acknowledge his or her receipt of this policy in 
writing. A copy of that acknowledgement shall be kept on permanent file in the 
city. Department heads and supervisors shall also be responsible for insuring 
that all employees under their direction are familiar with this policy, 
MAKING SEXUAL HARASSMENT COMPLAINTS 
Any employee who feels he or she is being subjected to s exual harassment 
should immediately contact one of the persons below with whom the employee feels 
the most comfortable. Complaints may be made orally or in writing t o :  
1 .  The employee ' s  immediate supervisor, 
2 ,  The employee ' s  department head. 
3 ,  The city ' s  equal employment opportunity officer, 
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4 .  The city manager. 
5 .  The mayor. 
Employees have the right to circumvent the employee chain of command in 
· selecting which person to whom to make a complaint of sexual harassment. 
Regardless of to which of the above persons the employee makes a complaint 
of sexual harassment , the employee should be prepared to provide the following 
information: 
- Employee ' s  name, department and position title. 
- The name of the person or persons commit ting the sexual harassment , 
including their title/ s ,  i f  known. 
- The specific nature of the sexual harassment ,  how long i t  has gone on, 
and any employment action (demotion, failure to promote,  dismissal, 
refusal to hire, transfer, e tc . )  taken against you as a result of the 
harassment , or any other threats made against you as a result of the 
harassment. 
- Witnesses to the harassment. 
- Whether you have previously reported such harassment and, if so, when and 
to whom. 
REPORTING AND INVESTIGATION OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT COMPLAINTS 
Against An Employee, Including the City Manager 
The city manager i s  the person designated by the city to be the investiga­
tor of complaints of s exual harassment. The city manager may delegate the 
investigation to another city employee at his discretion. In the event the 
sexual harassment complaint is against the city manager ,  the investigator shall 
be a municipal employee appointed by the mayor. 
When an allegation of sexual harassment is made by any employee , the person 
to whom the complaint is made shall immediately prepare a report of the 
complaint according to the preceding section and submit it to the city manager, 
or in the event the sexual harassment complaint is against the city manager , to 
the mayor. 
The inves tigator shall make and keep a written record of the investigation, 
including notes of verbal responses made to the investigator by the person 
complaining of sexual harassment , witnesses interviewed during the inves tiga­
tion, the person against whom the complaint of s exual harassment was made, and 
any other person contacted by the investigator in connection with the investiga­
tion. The notes shall be made at the time the verbal interview is in progres s .  
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When the investigator receives a complaint of sexual harassment , he or she 
shall immediately: 
- Obtain a written s tatement from the person complaining of sexual 
harassment which includes a comprehensive report of the nature of the 
sexual harassment complained of , and the t imes ,  dates , and places where 
the sexual harassment occurred. The investigator shall verbally question 
the person complaining of s exual harassment about any information in the 
written s tatement which i s  not clear or needs amplification. 
- Obtain written statements from witnesses which include a comprehensive 
report of the nature of the conduct witnessed, and the time s ,  dates , and 
places where the conduct occurred, and the conduct of the person 
complaining of sexual harassment toward the person against whom the 
complaint of sexual harassment was made. The investigator shall 
verbally quest ion witnesses about any information in their written 
statements which is not clear or needs amplification. 
- Obtain a written s tatement from the person against whom the complaint of 
sexual harassment has been made. The investigator shall verbally 
question the person against whom the complaint of sexual harassment has 
been made about any information in the written s tatement which is not 
clear or needs amplification. 
- Prepare a report of the investigation, which includes the written 
statement of the person complaining of sexual harassment , the written 
statements of witnesses , the written s tatement of the person against whom 
the complaint o f  sexual harassment was made, and all the investigator ' s  
notes connected to the investigation, and submit the report to the mayor.  
Against An Elected Off icial 
Complaints against an elected official shall be investigated by a city 
employee appointed by the city commission. The investigator s hall investigate 
a complaint of sexual harassment against an elected official in the same manner 
as outlined in this policy for the investigation of complaints against city 
employees. However, upon the completion of the investigation, the investigator 
shall submit the report of his investigation to the city commission. 
ACTION ON COMPLAINTS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
Against All Employees Except the C ity Manager 
Upon receipt of a report of the investigation of a complaint o f  sexual 
harassment , the city manager shall immediately review the report. If the city 
manager determines that the report is not complete in some respect , he may 
question the person complaining of sexual harassment , the person against whom 
the complaint of sexual harassment has been made , witnesses to the conduct in 
question or any other person who may have knowledge about the conduct in 
question. Howeve r ,  if the city manager feels the investigation report is 
adequate, he may make a determination of whether or not sexual harassment 
occurred, based on the report .  
I I 
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Based upon the report the city manager shall, within a reasonable t ime , 
determine whether the conduct of the person against whom a complaint of sexual 
harassment has been made constitutes sexual harassment . In making that deter­
mination, the city manager shall look at the record as a whole and at the tota­
lity of circumstances ,  including the nature of the conduct in question, the 
. context in which the conduct,  if any , occurred, and the conduct of the person 
complaining of sexual harassment. The determination of whether sexual 
harassment occurred will be made on a case-by-case basis . 
If the city manager determines that the complaint of sexual harassment is 
founded, he shall take immediate and appropriate disciplinary action against 
the employee guilty of sexual harassment , consistent with his authority under 
the municipal charter, ordinances , rules or regulations pertaining to employee 
discipline. 
The disciplinary action shall be consistent with the nature and severity of 
the offense, the rank of the employee, and any other factors the city manager 
believes relate to fair and efficient administration of the city, including , but 
not limited t o ,  the effect o f  the offense on employee morale, public percep­
tion of the o ffens e ,  and the l ight in which it casts the city. The disciplinary 
action may include demotion, suspension, dismissal, warning or repriman<l . A 
determination of the level o f  disciplinary action shall also be made on a case­
by-case basis.  
A written record o f  disciplinary action taken shall be  kept , including ver­
bal reprimands.  
In all events ,  an employee found guilty of sexual harassment shall be 
warned not to retaliate in any way against the person making the complaint of 
sexual harassment , witnesses or any other person connected with the investiga­
tion of the complaint of sexual harassment. 
Against The C ity Manager 
Upon receipt o f  a report on the investigation o f  a complaint of sexual 
harassment against the city manager ,  the mayor shall present the report to the 
city commission. If  the city commission determines that the complaint of sexual 
harassment is f ounded ,  it may discipline the city manager consistent with its 
authority under the municipal charter, ordinances , resolutions or rules 
governing discipline of the city manager. 
Against An Elected Official 
The city commission may discipline an elected official in whatever manner 
i t  deems appropriate , consistent with its authority under s tate law, the munici­
pal charter, ordinances , resolutions or other rules governing discipline of 
elected officials . 
Sexual Harassment Committed by Non-employees 
In cases o f  sexual harassment committed by a non-employee against a city 
employee in the workplace , the city manager shall take all l awful steps to 
insure that the sexual harassment is brought to an immediate end. 
OBLIGATION OF EMPLOYEES 
Employees are not only encouraged to report instances of sexual 
harassment , they are obligated to report instances of sexual harassment. Sexual 
harassment exposes the city to l iability, and a part of each employee' s j ob is 
'to reduce the city ' s  exposure to l iability. 
Employees are obligated to cooperate in every investigation of s exual 
harassment , including, but not necessarily limited to, coming forward with evi­
dence , both favorable and unfavorable, to a person accused of sexual harassment , 
fully and truthfully making a written report or verbally answering questions 
when required to do so by an investigator during the course of an investigation 
of sexual harassment. 
Employees are also obligated to refrain from f iling bad f aith complaints 
of sexual harassment. 
Disciplinary action may also be taken against any employee who fails to 
report instances of sexual harassment , or who fails or refuses to cooperate in 
the investigation of a complaint of sexual harassment, or who f iles a complaint 
of sexual harassment in bad faith. 
OPEN RECORDS 
The Tennessee Open Records Law at Tennessee Code Annotated , Section 
1 0-7-503 through 1 0-7-506 probably applies to the records in sexual harassment 
cases , as it does to virtually all other municipal records . In other words , 
complaints and reports of s exual harassment , including the investigative report,  
probably cannot be kept confidential, perhaps not even during the investiga­
tion. However ,  the value of written records in s exual harassment cases , as in 
most other cases where an investigation occurs from which disciplinary action 
against an employee might arise, requires that a written record of the investi­
gation be kept to help insure j ustice and e fficient municipal administration. 
M�Jlal((J:���dvisory Service 
The University of Tennessee 
891 20th Street 
Knoxville, Tennessee 37996-4400 
MR THOMAS BALLARD 
I NBT I TUTI::: FOi'( l"'UF<L IC E>l:O:l:(V I CE 
C I TY OF KNOXVILLE 
:I.()';' BTUDENT BEJ( V I CE!:> BLDG 
KNOXVILLE TN 37996 
Non-Profit Org. 
U.S. POSTAGE l 
PAID 
